A Social View of Mathematics Implications for Mathematics Education
Stephen Lerman South B;mk Polytechnic, London In recent literatureone increasinglyfinds the proposal that we take a more social view of mathematics, but the Intention can vary considerably. On the one hand, It can mean a recognition of the social nature of teacher/pupil Interaction, and the significance of the social context for mathematics educaHan, perhaps the last school subject toconcem itself with anything other than content and the manner of its presentation. On the other hand it can be a recognition of the invasion of the mathematics classroom by controversial Issues. In Britain recently, the PrimeMlnistercofll)lalned that childrenInour schools are learning anti-racist mathematics instead of arithmetic. In another Instance the conservative press complained about a public examinationquestion that contained several parts asking pupils to read from a graph of arms expenditure by Nato and the Warsaw Pact. It ended with a question concerning the number of weeks of arms expenditure that would be required to feed the starving peoples of the world. It is cbvcus which part of the question was considered objectionable,
The intention of this paper is 10propose that there are distinct consequences of a social view of mathematical knowlectge, and to briefly present two examples. In order to do this I will first indicate my use of the notion of a social view of mathematics. I take this to apply to mathematical knowledge itself, in that the history of mathematics is not one of the gradual revetatcn of absolute truths, but. as with all knowledge, the consequence of people's ideas, interest, conflicts and patronage, and Is culturally and tef1"C)Orally relative. Mathematical knowledge is a social construction, Ihe meaning of a concept such as 'polyhedron' for example, lollowing Lakatos, is negotiated andadapted accordingto convention and agreement, through proofs as explanations, leading to basic refutable statements. It is not the case that there exists, in some universal sense, a concept called 'polyhedron', which merely needs discovery and explication. This equally applies to notions of proal, tMh and rigor, by which we justify particular areas 01 mathematics. Consequently, there is no natural or logical necessity to the state of mathematical knowledge at present. Undoubtedly we have a body of mathematical knowledge, that generally works, but it is In the nature of a library of acaJrnu·
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lated experience, ratherthan universaltnrths.ln any case, the 'It' refers to that collection of books on the shelves of the partlQJlar libraries that we frequent. Bishop, D'Ambrosio, Gerdes and others highlight our culturally restricted view 01 mathematical concepts. I suggest that the consequences of a social view of mathematical knowledge itself are far-reaching, Including: 1) that there are anemative mathematical concepts, the direction of mathematical development is not a necessary one ;
2) that, since mathematical truths have always been taken as the paradigmof true propositions in philosophy in general, taking this last bastion of certainty as itself relative Isquite fundamental to ourwhole notion of knowledge;
3) that there is atull sociology of knowledge, dealing synvnetrically and impartially with 'true' mathematics as well as 'false'; 4) that lhewond 'out there', includ ing the mathematical, is unknowable in any universal a priori sense.
This notionwas proposed by the radical eonstructivlsts at the last PME conference in Montreal, and it is Important to recognize that this is a central . problem for philosophy today, as well as for mathematics education. Taking this alternative view of malhematics. there are many possible consequences, forteaching styles, curriculum development etc., and I have described these elsewhere (Lerman 1983 (Lerman , 1986 (Lerman , 1987 . I will develop here just two illustrations 01 implications for mathematics education, namely political and social education through mathematics, and the notion 01 ability.
Firstly, I suggest that teachers of matnematics can no longer sit in the school staflroom, believing that values enter every dassroom except the mathematics one, and this not simply and solely because of arguments such as that education is everyone's responsibnity. Since mathematics Is as fTkJCh a social construction as any other form of knowledge, It is OJlture-bound and value-laden. A strong case can be made for characteriZing mathematical values as sexist, for instance . Further, eccelogical analyses such as those of Freire, Apple and others propose that knowledge is power, Ie . that different conceptions of knowledge reflect different forms of social relationships and control. Freire. for instance, describes the 'bank ing concept ' of education, whereby students activities are restricted to SlOring,filing and retrieving, as against the 'prob'emposing ' concept, whereby people see themselves as owning the mathematics, and empowered to both pose questions and propose solutions, This Laner notion resonates strongly with the ideas of Stephen Brown and others in mathematics ec1Jcation.
Mathematics indeed serves a central function as a tool of government and power groups, since it is used to justify all sorts of pol icies and decisions, inciJding closing coal mines , fighting inflation rather that poverty, under.funding social services and health, and in the Britain disbanding the Inner London Education Authority, Education for a critical mathematics places power Inthe handsof people to have some control over thelr own lives, and in particular to have such control. Perhaps we have, in the end, more responsibility that any other school subject , not less, for political and social education.
Secondly, notions of ability in mathematics are dependent on theoretical jnterpretatcns of learning and understanding, and are not in themselves fixed, certain and value-free. It isa tormct platonism, that 'understanding' is a description of a particular completed mental state, much like the recall of forms known by the immortal soul. However, if concepts are themselves social constructions, determined by their use and consequently negotiable, the notion 'understanding' has a quite different meaning. Generally , we tend to see mathematics as, to quote Hart et al (Hart 1981) , a "very difficult~subject, that some people seem able to do, and others not, despite many years olleaming mathematics. If mathematics is about certain kinds of interactions with the world around, the application of certain ways of thought, or a particular language game , there is no reason why it should be very difficult. We have all encountered instances 01 Children and adults performing sometimes complex mathematical tasks successfully, and more important comfort~, m everyday life, but lailing to repeat those same tasks, achieve the same success, or indeed teel comfortable , in the mathematics classroom. This brings into question in aquite fundamental manner our notions 01 ability, and demands discussion, rethink ing and new direcbons of research. Clearly . new ways of learrnng call on new ways of assessment. and interpretation 01 'abilhy', Such very different directions as those described by , e.g. Cobb (1986) , focusing on the child 's construdions, which in general examine children 's grasp of th ings taught by the teacher. This latter notion 01 chikjren's understanding is the focus of rroch OtHJOing discussion and research, but the point being made here is that the concept 'ab ility' is related to the concept of 'understanding' with wh ich one iswol1dng, and not some absolute concept. Ifwe encourage chikjren's understanding 01 mathematics through independent work in investigations, and problem-posing, and on computers, through Logo for example , we need different ways to assess their progress.'Understanding' by these approaches ,does not mean t he successfu l application 01 a learned algorithm, and ttlJs cannot be identified by a trad itional pencil and paper test, deve loped with in a Piagetian frameworkof hierarchies of concepts. vet we adhere to this mode of assessment 01 children 's mathematical ability.
In conc lusion, as lOng ago as 1972, Rene Thom suggested that~all mathematical pedagogy, even if scarcely coherent, rests on a ph ilosoph y of mamematcs". This paper is a contribution to an examination of the ways in which anemauve philosophies bear fruit in mathematics educat ion.
